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NOTES
tiff's testimony in the Winkler case would probably have been held to
constitute a judicial adrmssion by all courts, since, as pointed out by the
court of appeals,s3 the testimony of the plaintiff was not contradictory.
On direct examination the plaintiff testified that she did not know of the
"particular defect" which caused the sidewalk to tilt, while on cross-ex-
amimation she testified that she knew that the sidewalk was in a general
state of disrepair. The fact that the plaintiff testified to a subjective mat-
ter- her knowledge that the sidewalk was defective - further persuades
that she should be held conclusively bound by her admission, even if it
were contradicted. Therefore, despite the strong language of the Winkler
opinion, it is not yet dear in Ohio how far the courts will go in holding
that the self-injuring testimony of a party operates as a judicial admis-
sion.34
The determination of whether a party's adverse testimony should con-
dusively bind him presents difficult problems for a court. It would be
unfair to penalize the party who has testified honestly but mistakenly,
especially since there is the additional danger that a party may become
confused and misstate his position under the pressure of a harassing cross-
examination. On the other hand, there is the natural desire of courts to
bar duplicitous or unfounded claims. The character of the testimony and
all the attendant circumstances of the case must be weighed, and where
"the circumstances are consistent with honesty and good faith,"35 the
court should not rule that a party is conclusively bound by his adverse
testimony.
DONALD J. FALLON
Ramifications of the Ohio Motor Vehicle
Certificate of Title Act
THE motor vehicle Certificate of Title Acte has had a significant im-
pact on many fields of Ohio law.
' Winkler v. Columbus, 48 Ohio L. Abs. 161 (Ohio App. 1947).
' Two other Ohio Supreme Court decisions are not authority for the proposition
that a party's adverse testimony always operates as a judicial admission. In Kahn's
Sons Co. v. Ellswtck, 122 Ohio St 576, 172 N.E. 668 (1930), the party's adverse
testimony was uncontradicted. In N.Y Cent. Ry. v. Stevens, 126 Ohio St. 395, 185
N.E. 542 (1933), the only evidence contradicting the party's adverse testimony was
his own inconsistent testimony. When this discrepancy was indicated to the party,
he expressly adopted the self-injurious statement. Under these circumstances, it is
generally held that he is bound by his adverse testimony. For a statement of the rule,
see Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Ry., 224 Mass. 405, 112 N.E. 1025 (1916).
nHill v. West End St. Ry., 158 Mass. 458, 459, 33 N.E. 582 (1893).
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Some form of certificate of title or registration of vehicles law has been
enacted in most states.2 One form, the registration type, has little effect on
the title or encumbrance of a motor vehicle, and is used primarily to aid
states in the collection of taxes and the enforcement of highway regulations.3
Other types of certificate of title acts "allow" liens and encumbrances to be
recorded thereupon, without indicating whether such recording amounts to
constructive notice.4 Some of these statutes are so construed as to give
added importance to the certificate as evidence of title and ownership.'
The strictest type of motor vehicle certificate act (sometimes com-
pared to the Torrens Land Registration Act6) utilizes the certificate of title
as a recording device for all encumbrances upon the motor vehicle, with
the record appearing on a single instrument. Under such a statute, the
certificate of title is regarded as either prima facie or conclusive evidence
of ownership depending upon the relationship of the parties and the court's
interpretation of the statute.'
Ohio's Certificate of Title Act is an example of the most stringent type.8
This stringency has caused a certain amount of harshness in results which in
many instances has confused our lower courts.
If the basic policy underlying the strict statutes is kept in mind, a better
evaluation of the Ohio cases can be made. These statutes were enacted to
curtail the theft of motor vehicles and to protect subsequent, innocent third
parties in their dealings with motor vehicles, which, because of their mobility
and frequent change of ownership, present unique problems in the laws of
personalty.'
IOHIO REv. CODE§ § 4505.01 -4505.99 (OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 6290-2-6296)
'See Note, WASH. U. L.Q. 539 (1951)
'For a listing of states having such a statute see Note, WASH. U. L.Q. 539, 552
(1951); cf. Gonchar v. Kelson, 114 Conn. 262, 158 Ad. 545 (1932); Bolton-
Swanby Co. v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 275 N.W 855 (1937)
4See Note WASH. U. L.Q. 539, 548 (1951)
'Cent. Finance Co. v. Garbler, 95 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1950); Gen. Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan. 220, 218 P.2d 181 (1950)
'See Note, 48 YALE L.J. 1238 (1939)
'See Note, WASH. U. L.Q. 539, 541 (1951)
'See especially, OHIO REV. CODE § 4505.04 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 6290-4)
'"The advent of motor vehicles early in the century created new problems and
necessitated the enactment of laws not theretofore required. Aside from statutes regu-
lating speed and other features of operation the first act of the General Assembly
relating specifically to motor vehicles was passed April 2, 1906 (98 Ohio Laws 320).
That act required registration of motor vehicles with the Secretary of State but the
obvious purpose of the act was to collect a registration fee and not to control the
method of transferring tile. Many amendatory acts were passed during the suc-
ceeding years which dealt with the same subject of registration but did not deal
with the method of transfer.
"On April 20, 1921 the General Assembly passed an act entitled 'To Prevent




The mechanics of the Ohio system are basically quite simple. Every
motor vehicle sold or purchased in Ohio must be represented by a certificate
of title.10 This certificate is issued in triplicate by the clerk of courts of
each county when a sale or other transfer is made. One copy is retained
by the clerk, another is sent to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles in Columbus,
and the third is given to the transferee or to the holder of the first lien.
Liens and encumbrances take priority according to the order of time in
which they are noted on the certificate.1 The importance of the certificate
can be readily ascertained from the language of Ohio General Code Sec-
tion 6290-4,12 which has been the cause of much litigation:
No person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner thereof, whether
such owner be a manufacturer, importer, dealer or otherwise, hereafter
shall acquire any right, tide, claim, or interest in or to said motor vehicle
until he shall have had issued to him a certificate of title to said motor
vehicle, or delivered to him a manufacturer's or importer's certificate for
said motor vehicle for a valuable consideration. No court in any case at
law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any per-
son in or to any motor vehicle, hereafter sold or disposed of, or mortgaged
or encumbered unless evidenced by a certificate of tide or manufacturer's
or importer s certificate duly issued in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter."
Notwithstanding the broad language of this section, which if literally
construed would change many established rules of law, some Ohio courts
have sought to limit its application in certain areas. There has developed
a certain hostility to the Act on the part of some courts which would indi-
cate that perhaps legislative changes are necessary in order to effectuate the
policy of the Act.
of sale or change in Ownership of Motor Vehicles.' (109 Ohio Laws 330) Further
amendatory acts were passed in 1923, 1925, 1931, but until the act of April 28,
1937, tide to a motor vehicle was evidenced only by a bill of sale. There was no pro-
vision for certificates of tide.
"Because of their mobility and frequent change of ownership it was obviously
necessary to create an instrument evidencing tide which would more adequately pro-
tect innocent purchasers of motor vehicles. On April 28, 1937 (117 Ohio Laws
373) the General Assembly passed an act entitled: 'To Prevent the Importation of
Stolen Motor Vehicles and Thefts and Frauds in the Transfer of Tide to Motor
Vehicles.' " Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 544, 99 N.E.2d 665,
667 (1951).
10 OIo REv. CoDE § 4505.03 (OsIO GEN. CODE § 6290-2)
1iOHio REv. CODE §§ 4505.08, 4505.13 (Omo GEN. CODE §5 6290-6, 6290-9)
u OHIo R.v. CODE § 4505.04 amended in 1953. The statute now allows as a sub-
stitute for proof of an interest: " admission in the pleadings or stipulation of the
parties."
" In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Taggart, 134 Ohio St. 374, 17 N.E.2d
758 (1938), the Certificate of Title Act was held constitutional.
1954)
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
CONFLICTS OF LAW
Interstate automobile transactions lead to many complex problems. For
example, P, a New York resident, sells an automobile to a buyer in New
York and receives a note and a conditional sales contract, or chattel mort-
gage which he records according to the law of New Yoik. The buyer,
without the consent of P, takes the automobile to Ohio in violation of his
contract and by perjury obtains a certificate of title showing no liens or
other encumbrances. He then sells the vehicle in Ohio to D, who pays value
and has no knowledge of the preceding events. P then sues D in replevin.
Prior to the present certificate Act, Ohio, on the basis of comity, fol-
lowed the majority rule favoring a foreign conditional sales vendor or chattel
mortgagee over the local innocent purchaser for value when the initial
transaction and recording took place in the foreign jurisdiction."4
After the passage of the Certificate of Title Act, the courts of appeals in
Ohio were split as to the effect of the Act on the majority rule. One court,
following the maority rule, held for the out-of-state plaintiff in the above
fact situation, on the ground that the purpose of the Act was to protect
owners of automobiles against fraud. The certificate of title procured by
false representations was held to be void ab imtio, and therefore the title of
the subsequent holder for value was no greater than that of his transferor. 5
However, the view of most of the Ohio appellate courts was to the
effect that Ohio General Code Section 6290-4 was applicable to an out-of-
state owner even though he had complied fully with his respective state
laws, because to favor such an out-of-state plaintiff would contravene the
clear policy enunicated in the Ohio Certificate of Title Act.'6
In Kelley Kar Co. v Finklri,7 the Ohio Supreme Court resolved this
split by holding that an out-of-state conditional vendor cannot succeed in
replevin as against a subsequent, innocent, Ohio purchaser for value who
has a certificate of title without any notation of the foreign vendor's lien,
even though the initial Ohio certificate was obtained by fraud.' 8 The court,
"Kanaga v. Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134 (1858); Reising v. Universal Credit Co., 50
Ohio App. 289, 198 N.E. 52 (1935)
'Associates Discount Corp v. Colonial Finance Co. 88 Ohio App. 205, 98 N.E.2d
848 (1950); see also Moch v. Kaffits, 75 Ohio App. 305, 62 N.E.2d 172 (1944).
" White Allen Chevrolet Co. v. Licher, 51 Ohio L. Abs. 394, 81 N.E.2d 232 (App.
1948); Schiefer v. Schnaufer, 71 Ohio App. 431, 50 N.E.2d 365 (1943); Union
Commercial Corp. v. Schmunk Co., 30 Ohio L. Abs. 116 (App. 1939)
'"155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951); accord, Royal Industrial Bank of Louis-
ville v. Klein, 92 Ohio App. 309, 110 N.E.2d 40 (1952)
" The court reasoned that to maintain replevin the out-of-state conditional vendor
must rely on his own title or right to possession and not on the fraud in the chain of
title of the defendant, and that the statute predudes the enforcement of his interest
where it is not evidenced on the certificate of title.
[Slimmer
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on the basis that Section 6290-4 declared the public policy of this state, re-
jected the contention that comity should be given.19
A recent court of appeals case 20 confined the Kelley Kar case to instances
where the contract of sale to the defendant was made in Ohio. Thus, where
the Ohio defendant purchased an automobile in Michigan and subsequently
obtained an Ohio certificate of title without actual knowledge of the plain-
tiff's chattel mortgage which was properly recorded under the laws of
Michigan, the plaintiff prevailed in an action for conversion2' not with-
standing the fact that this entailed the enforcement of an interest not evi-
denced on the Ohio certificate of title and hence in contravention of Ohio
General Code Section 6290-4. The court reasoned that since the contract of
sale to the defendant was made in Michigan, its law governed the rights of
the parties, thereby invoking the comity rule previously held inapplicable
in Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler. It is submitted that this reasoning cannot
withstand analysis. As interpreted by the supreme court, the statute effects
the right to sue,22 is operative when an interest is being enforced against
an Ohio certificate of title, and is not dependent upon where the contract
of the parties was entered into. Furthermore the plaintiff must rely on the
enforcibiity of his own interest, not on the weakness of the defendant's
title. Thus, the place of the defendant's purchase cannot be determinative
of the result when it is plaintiff's tide or interest which is being enforced,
and, since the prior cases23 have held the lex loci contractus not controlling,
compliance with the Act is a condition precedent to the recognition of a
right, title or interest.
The lex loci contractus rationale was also invoked in a recent bankruptcy
"By the law of comity between different states the lex loci contractus controls as
to the validity and construction of personal contracts though not as to the remedy or
rule of evidence, nor where it dashes with the rights of our own citizens, or the pol-
icy of our own laws." Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 549, 99 N.E.2d
665, 669 (1951).
' Associates Discount Corp. v. Main Street Motors, Inc., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 216, 113
N.E.2d 734 (App. 1952).
' Under Michigan law the chattel mortgage need not be noted on the certificate of
title but its recording in the recorder's office is constructive notice to subsequent pur-
chasers. Defendant being a dealer failed in his attempt to invoke the floor-plan
doctrine in seeking to estop the plaintiff. Thus it was held that the plaintiff pre-
vailed because the defendant had constructive notice of its lien.
--Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 NXE.2d 665 (1951); Mielke v.
Leeberson, 150 Ohio St. 528, 83 N.E.2d 209 (1948).
'Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951); Royal Indus-
trial Bank of Louisville v. Klein, 92 Ohio App. 309, 110 N.E.2d 40 (1952); White
Allen Chevrolet Co. v. Licher, 51 Ohio L. Abs. 394, 81 N.E.2d 232 (App. 1948);
Schiefer v. Schnaufer, 71 Ohio App. 431, 50 N.E.2d 365 (1943); Union Commer-
cal Credit Corp. v. Schmunk Co., 30 Ohio L. Abs. 116 (App. 1939); contra, As-
sociates Discount Corp. v. Colonial Finance Co., 88 Ohio App. 205, 98 N.E.2d 848
(1950); Moch v. Kaffits, 75 Ohio App. 305, 62 N.E.2d 172 (1944).
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proceeding.24 The bankrupt had not procured an Ohio certificate of tide
on an automobile purchased outside the state. A mortgagee sought to en-
force his out-of-state recorded lien. Because the statutes are permissive
rather than mandatory as to the acquisition of an Ohio certificate of tide on
such an automobile, 25 the court held that the mortgagee was not precluded
from enforcing its lien by Ohio General Code Section 6290-4. The court's
analysis is correct, it is submitted, only because no interest was being en-
forced against an Ohio certificate of title. The statute actually had no appli-
cation to the case.
Although a literal application of the statute would protect the local pur-
chaser with a clear certificate of tide procured from a thief, one court of
appeals has held that the out-of-state owner will prevail-.2  This court held
that the provisions of the Act did not prevent the application of the general
rule that stolen property may be recovered from an innocent purchaser so
long as it is identified. This seems to be a just and correct decision when it
is recalled that one of the purposes of the Act is to stop the theft of auto-
mobiles.
Although in this conflicts of law area the results seem justified under a
literal construction of the statute, it is submitted that by allowing a mort-
gagor or conditional vendee to pass good tide to subsequent bona fide
Ohio purchasers by perjury when procuring the Ohio tide, Ohio may well
become the dumping ground for encumbered motor vehicles to the detri-
ment of out-of-state finance companies.
INTRASTATE TRANSACTIONS
I. Passage of Title
The provisions of the Ohio Certificate of Title Act prevent the passage
of tide except upon a transfer of the tide certificate.27  Thus, the contrary
intentions of the parties and the presumptions of intention found in the
Uniform Sales Act2 8 are modified to some extent.
If the certificate of tide is improperly issued by the clerk of the wrong
county due to a mistake in the address of the purchaser, this fact is no de-
fense to the enforcement of a lien noted on the improperly issued certificate,
in the buyer's bankruptcy proceedings, since the buyer had sufficient tide
to validate the lien.
2 9
' In re Swesey, 112 F. Supp. 773 (N.D. Ohio 1953)
'OHIO REv. CODE § 4505.06 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 6290-5)
'Moch v. Kaffits, 75 Ohio App. 305, 62 N.E.2d 172 (1944)2 1OHIO REV. CODE 5 4505.04 (OHiO GEN. CODE § 6290-4) "No person acquiring
a motor vehide shall acquire any title until such person has had issued
to him a certificate of title. "
21 OHIO REv. CODE § 1315.20 (OIO GEN. CODE § 8399)
(Sumnmer
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Where the description of the automobile in the certificate of title was
definite enough to enable the automobile to be identified by inquiries,
there was sufficient compliance with the law to pass title as against an out-
of-state lien holder.30
It has been held, however, that where both the engine and the serial
number on the certificate of tile differ from those on the cat purchased, the
buyer may maintain an action for breach of unplied warranty on the part of
the seller that he had the right to sell the car 1
Risk of loss may be passed to a purchaser without the certificate of ttle
if the purchaser has done all he can under the statute to obtain the certifi-
cate.32 Thus, where there had been a sale with delivery of possession of the
car in return for an installment note and chattel mortagage, the delivery of
the signed application for transfer of title to the insured vendor within
the statutory period33 passed actual ownership with possession and control
to the purchaser. Therefore, the insured vendor could not collect for dam-
ages sustained to the vehicle the day following the above transaction. The
court did not decide whether the bare legal title had passed, but said that
since the purchaser was entitled to the certificate upon completion of the
statutory procedure, he was to be considered an "owner" so as to disallow the
vendor's claim of an insurable interest.
In another risk of loss case34 the supreme court held that the insured
vendor was still the "owner" within the terms of the policy where possession
of the vehicle was transferred but there was no assignment or delivery of
the certificate of title to the purchaser and no application for transfer of
title. The court, commenting on the prior case, said,
Where endorsement and delivery of a certificate of tide for an auto are
made, title passes even though there is a failure on the part of the recipient
to secure the issuance of a new certificate in his name. It follows that where
an owner fails to comply with the certificate of title act by not assigning
and delivering his certificate of title to the purchaser tide does not pass.
However, an application for an original certificate of title has been held
'In re Mitchell, 104 F. Supp. 969 (N.D. Ohio 1952), aff'd. 67 Ohio L. Abs. 105,
202 F.2d 426 (6th cir. 1953) contra: 1940 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. [Ohio) No. 1867
'Royal Industrial Bank of Louisville v. Klein, 92 Ohio App. 309, 110 N.E.2d 40
(1952) (Year and model number omitted and serial number contained a letter
wholly foreign to the make of the automobile).
' Martin v. Coffman, 87 Ohio App. 398, 95 N.E.2d 286 (1949).
'Workman & Sayles v. The Republic Mutual Ins. Co., 144 Ohio St. 37, 56 N.E.2d
190 (1944).
'3OIo REv. CODE § 4505.06 (Omo GEN. CODE § 6290-5) (three days).
'Garlickv. McFarland, 159 Ohio St. 539, 113 N.E.2d 92 (1953); accord, Standard
Materials, Inc. v. Mass. Fire Ins. Co., 58 Ohio L. Abs. 393, 94 N.E.2d 809 (Franklin
Com. Pleas 1948).
' Garlick v. McFarland, 159 Ohio St. 539, 549, 113 N.E.2d 92, 97 (1953).
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insufficient to protect a bona fide purchaser as against a mortgagee of the
vendor holding the manufacturer's certificate of title.3 6 And evidence of
application for transfer of the certificate of title made by a third party is not
admissible to prove lack of ownership in the defendant when sued as owner
of a vehicle which injured the plaintiff.37
II. Rtghts of the Certificate of Title Holder
A literal construction of the statute would preclude the enforcement
of all interests legal or equitable unless evidenced by the certificate.3 Such
a far-reaching result, even if it were the legislature's intention, is certainly
not reflected in the court decisions.
Thus, a holder of the certificate is not protected from the enforcement
of an unnoted lien when there is a theft39 or forgery4 in his chain of tide
or interest or when he himself is the defrauder or one closely associated with
him.41 The possessor of the certificate is not protected when he has
failed to give valuable consideration for the purchase.4 2
A vendor who sold the vehicle but failed to assign or deliver the cer-
tificate of tilde could not rely on the certificate in a replevin action against
a bona fide purchaser from the vendee.43 Mere possession of the certificate
is of no legal significance without proper assignment and transfers no
right, title or interest.44
As between the original parties to a transaction, it can be fairly stated
that the courts will recognize certain equitable rights even where there is
no certificate of title.45 For example, in Martin v. Rtdge Motor Sales,46 P
wanted to exchange his car for one owned by D. P delivered his automobile
and assigned his certificate of tide to D D told P that if the car he was
giving P was not satisfactory it could be returned. P returned the vehicle
and demanded the return of his own vehicle, but D refused. Thereafter
' Crawford Finance Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25 N.E.2d 306 (1939)
' Fredericks v. Birkett L. Williams Co., 68 Ohio App. 217, 40 N.E.2d 162 (1940)
:' OHio REV. CODE § 4505.04 (Oino GEN. CODE § 6290-4) " nor shall any
waiver or estoppel operate. No court in any case at law or in equity [shall
recognize an interest unless evidenced by a certificate of tile.]"
"Moch v. Kaffits, 75 Ohio App. 305, 62 N.E.2d 172 (1944)
'Erie County United Bank v. Bogart, 75 Ohio App. 250, 61 N.E.2d 811 (1945);
Erie County United Bank v. Fowl, 71 Ohio App. 220, 49 N.E.2d 71 (1942) Laz-
erick v. Associate Inv. Co., 30 Ohio L. Abs. 112 (1939)
" Automobile Finance Co. v. Munday, 137 Ohio St. 504, 30 N.E.2d 1002 (1940).
"OHio REv. CODE § 4505.04 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 6290-4); Automobile Finance
Co. v. Munday, 137 Ohio St. 504, 30 N.E.2d 1002 (1940)
"Yarwood v. De Lage, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 205, 91 N.E.2d 272 (1949).
"Pierce v. Aid Invest. & Discount Co., 88 Ohio App. 193, 98 N.E.2d 316 (1950).
"Kattwinkel v. Kattwinkel, 80 Ohio App. 397, 74 N.E.2d 418 (1947) (Dictum).
"78 Ohio App. 116, 69 N.E.2d 93 (1946).
[Summer
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replevin was brought by P, who did not have a certificate of title, having
given it to the defendant. The court held that P had the title and right to
immediate possession as against D
The problem of the effect of Section 6290-4 on the common-law arti-
san's lien was recently before a lower court."7 Replevin was brought by the
owner of the vehicle, and the defendant asserted his artisan's lien and in-
troduced the plaintiff's certificate of title, having induced the plaintiff to
part with it. The lien was not recorded on the back of the certificate be-
cause the clerk of courts believed himself to be without power under the
statute so to record it. The court, holding for defendant, reasoned that the
defendant's mere possession of the certificate without assignment was not
determinative of the issue, but that the statute did not apply to artisan's liens
because they are not encumbrances within the meaning of the statute. Al-
though the rationale is questionable, this result is not surprising in view
of the recognition in other cases of interests apparently prohibited by a
literal construction of the statute. The court argued that if the statute was
intended to abrogate the common law lien, dearer language would be neces-
sary. The problem is one of administration rather than interpretation. The
difficulties involved in a mechanic's obtaining possession of the certificate
of title in order to have Ins lien noted thereon, even assuming the clerk of
courts has the statutory power to record it, point to the weakness of the
statute and justify the result in the instant case.48
In many instances, however, the statute has been construed literally so
as to make the certificate of title conclusive evidence of ownership.49 Thus
equitable interests are cut off by assignment of the certificate of tide to in-
nocent third parties.50
Where a son brought replevin against his father's creditor who had
seized the automobile on execution, the introduction of the certificate of
title into evidence by the son constituted a "prima facie" case even though
the certificate of title had been assigned to the son only three days prior to
the issuance of execution. 1
'Justice v. Bussard, 114 N.E.2d 305 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1953).
"The court analogized to an undecided contract question and doubted whether the
statute would change the common law result.
"If a drive-it-yourself company rented a motor vehide for thirty days, the tran-
saction would not constitute either a sale or disposal of the car. Under these circum-
stances and in the absence of default, could the company successfully replevin before
the expiration of the contract period?"
" See Mielke v. Leeberson, 150 Olo St. 528, 83 N.E.2d 209 (1948).
' In Kattwrnkel v. Katttwnkel, 80 Ohio App. 397, 74 N.E.2d 418 (1947), Plantiff
assigned his interest to his wife for the period of his army service. The wife assigned
it to her sister while a divorce decree was pending. Held: for defendant.
" Diebel v. Weller, 41 N.E.2d 904 (Ohio App. 1940) (no question of fraud was
nased).
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One case construed the statute literally even as between me parties.5 2 The
plaintiff's agent sold a new automobile to the defendant in return for
cash and a trade-in. Later the plaintiff, being dissatisfied with the trade-in,
brought replevin, relying on the certificate of tide which he had not as yet
assigned to the defendant. The court ignored the apparent authority of the
agent to accept trade-ins and held for the plaintiff, basing its decision on
Section 6290-4.
In a purchase money resulting trust the certificate of title would be in
a legal stranger to the person who paid the consideration; and the holder of
the certificate would be bound ordinarily to turn over the certificate to the
person rightfully entitled to it. But under Ohio's strict certificate of tide
law can the true equitable owner prevail as against the legal stranger who
has possession of the certificate of tide and the vehicle? An appellate court
held53 that the equitable owner could prevail since the Ohio General Assem-
bly did not intend to remove motor vehicles from the law of trusts.
Recently, however, the supreme court reached a contrary result and
held5 4 that by reason of the provisions of Section 6290-4 a resulting trust
with respect to a motor vehicle can not be created in Ohio. Although ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with the statute55 the court felt that no other hold-
ing was possible under a literal construction." The practical result, which is
to require all motor vehicles to be registered in the names of the real
owners, works no real hardship upon anyone. The effect of the decision,
however, points up the fact that the statute because of its far-reaching
language changes many established rules of law beyond the apparent purpose
of the legislature.
In another case,57 an automobile purchaser sued to recover the purchase
price on the ground of his minority. He introduced the certificate of tide
in evidence. An objection was sustained by the trial court to the admission
of evidence of the defendant that, although the certificate was made out to
the minor, the minor's father in fact purchased the vehicle with his money.
'Kelley Motors v. Adams, 91 Ohio App. 68, 107 N.E.2d 363 (1951)
'Douglas v. Hubbard, 91 Ohio App. 200, 107 N.E.2d 884 (1951) App. dis'm
157 Ohio St. 94, 104 N.E.2d 182 (1952)
'In re Estate of Case, 161 Ohio St. 288, 118 N.E.2d 836 (1954)
"The drastic character of this statute and its far-reaching effect become more appar-
ent with the passing of time. This court shares the reluctance of trial and appellate
courts to adopt all the changes in long settled law, which the literal construction of
this statute requires." 161 Ohio St. at 291-292, 118 N.E.2d at 838.
""In view of this statute, how can a court entertain evidence to contradict the cer-
tificate of tide? How can a court find that the equtable tile is in someone other
than the holder of the certificate of title? All courts are forbidden, either in law or
equity, to recognize any right, claim or interest as well as any title, unless evidenced
by certificate of tide." 161 Ohio St. at 292, 118 N.E.2d at 839.
"Davis v. Clelland, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 92 N.E.2d 827 (App. 1950)
[Summer
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In affirming the lower court, the court of appeals said that the source of the
purchase money was not material to the defendant's rights and that to
permit the defendant to show who paid the money would require that the
minor's title to the automobile be challenged in contravention of Section
6290-4.
A vendee must take certain steps to rescind the sale of a motor vehicle.
Because a person cannot have a right tile, claim or interest in a motor
vehicle without a certificate, the Ohio vendor has the right to receive not
only possession of the vehicle, but the certificate of tite as well. Thus, when
g rescission is based on the vendee's minority, a tender of the certificate to
the vendor is essential to determine the date to which depreciation allow-
ance will be made.8
Hiple v. Skolmutch59 dealt with the problem of making a gift of a car.
It was there held as a matter of law that a gift inter vivos of an automobile
cannot be established where the deceased donor did not assign the certifi-
cate of title to the donee. The court recognized that there may becases
where property rights in an automobile may be established in law or in
equity without strict compliance with the certificate of title act; however, it
held that the Ohio rule on gifts, requiring, in part, the irrevocable delivery
of a chattel to the extent practicable and possible under the circumstances,
prevented the completion of a gift of an automobile without a transfer of its
certificate of title.
Prior to the present Act with its requirement that all liens must be noted
on the certificate of title, Ohio followed the general rule that chattel mort-
gages on automobiles were filed in the recorder's office as in the case of all
other chattels. Yet notwithstanding the constructive notice given to subse-
quent purchasers by a proper recording of the mortgage, the floor-plan doc-
trine had been held to preclude the enforcement of the mortgage against
bona fide purchasers.60 Thus, even though the mortgage was properly re-
corded, if the mortgagee allowed a dealer to display the automobile upon
the salesroom floor, authority to sell was implied, and the mortgagee was
estopped to assert his lien against an innocent purchaser for value in the
usual course of business.6'
However, after the Act became effective, two cases held for the mort-
gagee in possession of the manufacturer's certificate as against the buyer
"Rush v. Grevey, 90 Ohio App. 536, 107 N.E.2d 560 (1951).
88 Ohio App. 529, 100 N.E.2d 642 (1950).
€See Note, 5 Oto ST. L.J. 422 (1939).
'Nat Guarantee & Finance Co. v. Pfaff Motor Car Co., 124 Ohio St. 34, 176 N.E.
678 (1931); Edwards v. Automobile Finance Co., 63 Ohio App. 193, 25 N.E.2d
851 (1939); Colonial Finance Co. v. McCrate, 60 Ohio App. 68, 19 N.E.2d 527
(1938); Davis v. First Cent. Trust Co., 15 Ohio L. Abs. 3 (App. 1933); Nat. Guar-
antee & Finance Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 10 Ohio L. Abs. 658 (App. 1931).
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who had no certificate of tide.62 In one case 63 the innocent purchaser had
done all he could under the Act to obtain his certificate of tide, having
made application therefor prior to obtaining possession of the automobile.
Even though the court admitted that the mortgagee knew that by allowing
the dealer to place the automobile in his showroom it would be sold, it
applied the statute literally and allowed no waiver or estoppel to operate in
favor of the innocent purchaser.
It is submitted that for the protection of the buying public the statute
should not have been so literally construed. The same policy factors which
originally evolved the floor-plan doctrine and extended it to preclude the
enforcement of properly recorded mortgages are still present today. Cer-
tainly this problem should receive consideration either by legislative change
or judicial construction.
It is also submitted that even under the present Act floor-plan estoppel
can be invoked against such mortgagees. If Section 6290-4 is considered only
a general statute, then special statutes would control. Ohio Revised Code
Section 4505 (Ohio General Code Section 6290-9), a statute summarizing
the priority of liens, provides:
Exposure for sale of any motor vehicle by the owner thereof, with the
knowledge and consent of the holder of any lien, mortgage or encum-
brance shall not render the same void or ineffective as against the creditors
of such owner or holders of subsequent liens, mortgages or encumbrances
upon such motor vehicle.
The omission of any reference to subsequent purchasers in this obvious codi-
fication of the prior law as to the floor plan doctrine 4 indicates that floor-
plan estoppel can be invoked against mortgagees in a proper case. 5
EVIDENTIARY AND PLEADING MAT'ERS
When the Ohio courts have had to make evidentiary rulings involving
the certificate of title, the literalness of their interpretation of this Act
becomes readily apparent. In Mielke v. Leeberson,O the plaintiff sued to
recover for damage to his motor vehicle. The ownership of the automobile
was put in issue by the defendant's general denial. Although there was
abundant evidence of the plaintiff's ownership, he failed to introduce the
certificate of tide in evidence. The supreme court held that the certificate
of tide was the only acceptable mode of proof of ownership, stating:
Under the plain and unambiguous language of section 6290-4, a court
cannot recognize the right, tite, claim or interest of any person in or to
any motor vehicle, without the production of a certificate of tide, duly
issued in accordance with the Certificate of Tide Law, and any other evi-
dence of ownership is not of sufficient weight to sustain a verdict or judg-
ment where tide must be proved as a condition precedent for the validity
of such verdict or judgment.'
In answer to the contention that the legislature had in mind the protection
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of the real owner of an automobile from disposition of it to an innocent pur-
chaser by a thief and did not intend that Section 6290-4 should be used in
this type of case, the court said, "However, the language of Section 6290-4
General Code is not only sweeping but it is unrestricted and unlimted.""8
It is submitted that, despite the "unrestricted and unlimited" language
of the statute, the legislature did not intend it to apply to the facts of the
Mialke case. The statute itself expressly states that a court is prohibited
from recognizing, unless evidenced by a certificate of title, a right, tide,
daum or interest" to any motor vehicle, hereafter sold or disposed of or
mortgaged or encambermd." (Emphasis supplied.) A suit for damages to
a motor vehicle is certainly not a sale, a mortgage, an encumbrance or a
disposition of the vehicle.
A similar analysis of the statute was made in Petsmeyer v. Omar Co.69
The court of appeals held that the common law right of a bailee to sue for
damages to the bailor's motor vehide did not depend on tie bailee's hold-
ing a certificate of title to the automobile. The court argued that the
statute's reference to "right, title, claim or interest" did not include a bailee's
right to bring suit because the bailee was not required to establish title to the
auto in himself. Title was proved only as the basis of establishing the re-
lation of bailor and bailee. The interest of the bailee-was merely a posses-
sory one. Furthermore, the court stated that even if the right of the plaintiff
was held to be an interest in the automobile within the meaning of the Act,
it did not relate to any transaction included within the clause "hereafter sold
or disposed of or mortgaged or encumbered."
A few appellate courts since the Mielke case have dealt with the use
of waiver to prevent the defendant's raising of the issue of ownership on
appeal. Waiver has been based upon the defendant's conauct at the trial,
stipulations of the fact of ownership by the attorneys, or pleadings which
do not contravene the plaintiffs allegations of ownership."0 While waiver
is recognized, the results are in conflict because of the strictness or liberality
of the courts in construing a stipulation or conduct as an admission of the
'Associates Invest. Co. v. Le Boutillier, 69 Ohio App. 62, 42 N.E.2d 1011 (1941);
Crawford Finance Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25 N.E.2d 306 (1939)
'Crawford Finance Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25 N.E.2d 306 (1939).
It had been held prior to the act that subsequent mortgagees could not invoke
floor-plan estoppel. See note 61, supra.
' One author has indicated that one reason for the passage of the Act was to abolish
floor-plan estoppel. Note, 5 OWIO ST. L.J. 422, 430 (1939). However, dearer
language should be necessary to accomplish this purpose.
' 150 Ohio St. 528, 83 N.E.2d 209 (1948).
Id., Syllabus No. 1.
Id. at 534, 83 N.E.2d at 213.
95 Ohio App. 37, 117 N.E.2d 184 (1952).
T0See Beyer v. Miller, 90 Ohio App. 66, 103 N.E.2d 588 (1951); Clampitt v. Cleve-
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plaintiffs ownership. Thus, in the case of Harmon v. Liberty Cabs,71 the
defendant admitted in the pleadings that a collision occurred when the auto
of the plaintiff struck the defendant's auto, that the plaintiff was operating
his auto, and that the plaintiff's auto was struck by the defendant's auto; and
agreed to stipulate that the plaintiff's car was damaged in the amount alleged
by the plaintiff. The court said that the Mielke case was not controlling
under these facts and that the plaintiff need not present a certificate of title
because the pleadings and stipulation admitted the ownership of the ve-
hicle by the plaintiff. However, in Beyer v. Miller7 2 another court of ap-
peals has indicated that the stipulation must recognize in express terms the
existence of the certificate of tide and purport to dispense with its produc-
tion at the trial.
In 1953 Section 6290-4 was amended to permit, as a substitute for the
certificate of title, the proving of an interest in the motor vehicle: "(B) By
admission in the pleadings or stipulation of the parties."7 3 This amend-
ment leaves undecided, because of the Beyer case, whether the stipulation
must refer to the certificate of title as such as distinguished from mere own-
ership.
CONCLUSION
The Ohio Certificate of Title Act is basically a sensible solution to the
difficult problem of ownership of and interests in motor vehicles. It is
evident that the courts of this state will construe the statute literally in any
case where the rights of innocent third parties have intervened. This is
true even though a hardship may result to an out-of-state lien-holder who
has had no opportunity to comply with the Act.
When the immediate parties to a transaction are involved, the Ohio
courts apparently will continue to allow equitable interests to prevail even
though the unambiguous language of the statute would seem to call for a
different ruling.
The extent to which equitable and legal interests have been recognized
notwithstanding the language of the statute points to its weakness. The
relation of the certificate to contract rights, interests of bailees, mechanic's




land, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 61, 86 N.E.2d 506 (App. 1949); Harmon v. Liberty Cabs,
58 Ohio L. Abs. 286, 96 N.E.2d 304 (App. 1949); Wells v. Baltimore & 0. R.R.,
58 Ohio L. Abs. 225, 97 N.E.2d 75 (App. 1949); Fredericks v. Birkett L. Williams
Co., 68 Ohio App. 217, 40 N.E.2d 162 (1940).
' 58 Ohio L. Abs. 286, 96 N.E.2d 304 (App. 1949).
' 90 Ohio App. 66, 103 N.E.2d 588 (1951)
73OHIO REv. CODE § 4505.04.
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